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ABSTRACT 
  In this paper, we ask whether PROCAMPO helped Mexican agricultural producers benefit 
from NAFTA. Specifically, we explore the effect of these decoupled income payments 
(PROCAMPO) on producers’ ability to switch to cash crop production, and whether these 
payments help alleviate credit constraints for poorer producers. Given that WTO negotiations are 
currently stalled in part because of the trade concerns of developing nations, exploring the 
constraints that small producers face and whether decoupled subsidies can assist those producers in 
benefiting from new markets is important.  
  Unlike previous studies, who concentrated on specific regions and ejidal lands, we use nation-
wide county-level data, which allows for us to see the regional distribution of change across Mexico. 
We use these data to estimate the change in staple crop production as a function of county-level 
characteristics. We find some evidence to support the hypothesis that an increase in PROCAMPO 
payments leads to a decrease in the area planted in staples.  Second, the implementation of NAFTA 
is associated with greater cash crop production and we can see that the creation of new markets is, 
in general, leading to a reduction in land planted in staples. Third, we find that the effect of 
PROCAMPO is even larger for ejido producers, implying that their benefits are not constrained to 
larger producers. Last, we find evidence that areas closest to the United States border have seen a 
greater movement to cash crop production after NAFTA.  
  The authors would like to thank Rafael Garduño-Rivera, Pablo Alvarez, and Marybel de 
Soto for their extensive assistance in collecting the data used for this study.  
 









1.  INTRODUCTION 
The effect of the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA) on Mexican agriculture 
has been debated extensively over the past fifteen years.  While trade advocates note that Mexican 
farmers have dramatically increased the value of their agricultural exports to the United States and 
Canada, anti-globalization activists argue that NAFTA has harmed small-scale and subsistence 
producers in Mexico, forcing them to compete against subsidized imports.  In this paper, we 
examine which farmers in Mexico have benefited from NAFTA by being able to switch from 
traditional staples to the production of higher-value cash crops. Specifically, we ask whether the 
decoupled income payments under PROCAMPO have helped producers move to cash crops by 
alleviating credit constraints. Due to World Trade Organization (WTO) regulations, many 
developing countries have and may continue to move to agricultural support systems similar to 
PROCAMPO. Therefore understanding whether this decoupled income payment program can help 
agricultural producers overcome credit constraints and make the transition to cash crops may have 
important implications for policy development in developing countries worldwide. 
In 1995, the WTO’s Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
1 went into effect. As part of 
this agreement, the type of support that each country provided to the agricultural sector was placed 
into one of three “boxes.” Policies that cause high trade distortion, such as commodity specific price 
supports, fall into the “amber box” while those that are minimally trade distorting belong in the 
“green box.” Member countries of the WTO, such as Mexico, were therefore encouraged to reform 
their agricultural policy to allow their method of support to be categorized in the “green box.” 
Decoupled income payments are approved under “green box” requirements as they reduce trade 
distortion by delinking the payment from the production and prices of specific agricultural 
commodities.  
The first efforts to move towards decoupling of agricultural support were made by the 
United States and the European Union in the 1985 Farm Bill and the Common Agricultural Policy 
(CAP) Reform of 1992, respectively. The United States and European Union’s agricultural markets 
are much more highly developed than that of Mexico so when Mexico implemented a decoupled 
income payment system, PROCAMPO, in 1993 it was significant. Mexico’s program is an example 
of how moving to decoupled income payments in agriculture can affect farmers in a less developed 
country. In particular, by examining this program we can see how the poorest agricultural regions in 
                                                           
1 This round of agreements took place under the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) organization. As an 
outcome of the Uruguay Round of agreements, the GATT organization became the WTO in 1995. 4 
 
a developing country are affected by this form of decoupled payment.  This examination may 
provide details that assist other less developed countries in establishing similar programs, as 
international trade agreements further compel them in the coming years.  
There have been many studies that analyze the effects of instituting a decoupled income 
payment system. The majority of these focus on the agricultural markets of the United States and 
the European Union. One study found that these payments can effect production depending on a 
producer’s degree of credit constraint (Girante 2008). However, an additional study shows that at an 
aggregate level decoupled income payments have not led to an increase in on-farm investment 
(Burfisher 2003). In developed countries, such as the United States and European Union, these 
payments also tend to be capitalized into land values and rents, which means that producers income 
actually increases very little (Ciaian 2008). We find fewer studies that look directly at the effect of the 
transition to decoupled income payment on less developed countries. 
In addition, studies have specifically analyzed the effects of trade liberalization on exports, 
prices, and producer income in Mexico. However, fewer studies examine the effects of NAFTA in 
relation to the PROCAMPO program. The majority of these studies use data from the late 1990s, so 
NAFTA and the PROCAMPO program would only have been in effect for a few years. They also 
tend to concentrate on small regions and ejidal lands
2. Studies that examine the effects of the 
PROCAMPO program on producers in ejidos found that PROCAMPO has a positive multiplier 
effect on income and reduces household poverty (Sadoulet 2001 and Cord 2001). However neither 
study specifically discusses the use of these funds as transitional support to move towards the 
production of cash crops.  
By contrast, we use a unique county-level dataset in Mexico that includes the pre-NAFTA 
agricultural census and post-NAFTA county-level cropping information and government payments.  
Combining these data with population and economic censuses, we obtain information on 
population, education, infrastructure, and off-farm wages.  We have also constructed measures of 
road distance to the United States to control for those counties with a greater change in market 
access due to NAFTA.  This complete dataset then provides us with the ability to generate a broader 
view of crop changes across the entire country. Generating an econometric model using this data we 
are able to see the effects that trade liberalization and the movement from commodity specific price 
supports to decoupled income payments has had on agricultural at a regional level in Mexico. 
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We develop several hypotheses in regards to the effects of trade liberalization and decoupled 
income payments on agricultural production in Mexico. First, we hypothesize that the shift from 
commodity specific prices supports to decoupled income payments will be associated with a 
conversion to cash crops. Secondly, the implementation of NAFTA will also lead producers to 
transition to cash crop production particularly in those regions closest to the United States border.  
Last, we believe that direct payments such as PROCAMPO will aid credit constrained producers to 
make the often substantial investments needed to switch to cash crop production.  
We feel this paper makes several contributions.  First, to our knowledge, it is one of the few 
papers to consider the effect of PROCAMPO or other direct payments in developing countries on 
crop choice.  Specifically, we are able to see whether the effects of PROCAMPO were restricted to 
wealthy regions, or whether they also afforded poorer producers agricultural opportunities.  Second, 
we use a unique county-level data set to explore the regional effects of NAFTA on Mexican 
agricultural production choices.  Last, we consider the effect of PROCAMPO on credit. 
First, a background of Mexico’s agricultural policy will be described. This will include 
programs and policies that were in place prior to the signing of NAFTA and those that were created 
to garner the benefits from trade liberalization.  Then an evaluation of studies that have been 
conducted on these policies will be provided. Next, we present our conceptual model, which is 
based on agricultural household theory. This section will include a discussion detailing how our 
variables fit into the agricultural household construct. Then our data and empirical model will be 
described and results will be provided. Finally, conclusions, future extensions and applications will 
be discussed. 
2.  BACKGROUND 
The Mexican government implemented several policy changes affecting agriculture prior to 
signing NAFTA in 1994 and several more throughout the implementation phase of the trade 
agreement. The hope was that these policy changes would help agricultural producers assimilate to 
the increased competition from the United States and Canada and allow them to benefit from the 
new markets made available by NAFTA.  A timeline of trade liberalization events and agricultural 
policies discussed can be found in Table A-1 of the Appendix.  
To benefit from trade, producers need access to credit to make changes in crop choice in 
response to changes in relative prices. The expectation was that if agricultural producers could 
produce higher value crops for the export market, their incomes would increase. We have seen 6 
 
evidence of this effect as Mexico’s trade in agricultural products with the United States and Canada 
has steadily grown in the past fifteen years. According to the U.S. Department of Agriculture 
(USDA), Mexico’s average total exports to the United States in the period between 1991 and 1993 
were $2.5 billion U.S. dollars. By 2006-08 the average amount of exports to the United States was 
$10.2 billion U.S. dollars, which is a 299% increase from the period before NAFTA was 
implemented (Zahniser 2009, 47). The full effect of these changes on individual agricultural 
producers, specifically the rural poor, is more difficult to determine.  
The question remains as to whom in Mexico benefited from this trade. The World Bank 
reported that in 2002, 20.3% of the Mexican population was living below the national poverty line. 
Poverty is even greater in rural areas where 34.8% percent of the population live below the national 
poverty line (World Bank 2008, 17). Also the Gini Coefficient, as measured over the past fifteen 
years, shows that income disparity in Mexico has decreased very little since NAFTA (World Bank 
2009). The Gini Coefficient measures income distribution and shows that the income disparity 
between rich and poor has diminished slightly but still remains relatively high as compared to the 
other OECD countries. Not all regions within Mexico have benefited equally, as evidence shows 
that the northern and central states have received the majority of the benefits from trade. For 
example between 1999 and 2003 Mexico’s southern states only received one percent of the FDI that 
came into the country (Randall 2006, 111).  In addition, studies have shown that trade has primarily 
increased wages in the north Mexico (Robertson 2000 and Chiquiar 2008) and that the south has 
seen very little benefit from trade (Esquivel, 2005). 
Prior to the early 1990s, Mexico’s agricultural sector was heavily supported by the 
government.  CONASUPO (the National Company of Popular Subsistence) was the governmental 
agency that provided price supports, bought and distributed commodities, and provided inputs and 
credit from the mid-1960s through the mid-1990s. Credit was provided to small scale agricultural 
producers through Banrural. Banrural waived collateral requirements and had low penalties for 
default, so even producers that owned small areas of land or who were part of an ejido, had access to 
credit.  
In the early to mid-1990s several changes to the agricultural structure of Mexico were 
implemented. First, Article 27 was enacted in 1992 which granted the right for ejido lands to be titled, 
bought and sold. Prior to this law ejidatarios did not own the land and therefore were unable to use it 
for collateral to obtain loans from privately owned banks. As noted above, the Mexican government 
did however provide price supports, technical assistance, and credit through Banrural which did 7 
 
compensate somewhat for the lack of credit from private sources. With Article 27, land rights were 
granted so that that land could now be used for loan collateral or be sold.  
Second, state owned banks were privatized in the early 1990s which was of critical 
importance to agricultural producers. The belief was that when privatization occurred, the private 
banks would provide the necessary loans to the agricultural producers, both small and large. This 
surge in private lending did not occur as currently agriculture accounts for a very small part of bank 
lending (only 4.5 percent in 2001), and practically no commercial bank lending goes to small farmers 
(Income 2005, 235). Banrural was eventually dissolved in 2003 and replaced by the Financiera Rural, 
whose main purpose is to make loans to agricultural producers. As of 2009, Financiera Rural has 
granted over five hundred thousand rural loans, totaling over seven billion U.S. dollars (Financiera 
Rural 2009). It is not known whether these loans have included the poorest producers. However, it 
is known that access to credit is an important factor in lifting rural agricultural producers out of 
poverty, especially after the removal of price supports, technical assistance, and government 
provided fertilizers and pesticides.  Without access to credit the majority of the poor, subsistence 
agricultural producers will be unable to purchase these inputs that can help them modernize and 
increase their yields per hectare. They will also be unable to make the capital investment necessary to 
transition to cash crop production and fully realize the benefits from trade.  
The Mexican government established several programs to address the issues that agriculture 
producers would face with increased competition from the United States and Canada.  These 
programs tend to concentrate on providing agricultural producers transitional assistance so that they 
can benefit from trade.  Among these programs were the Target Income/Market Support Programs, 
Alianza por el Campo (the Alliance for the Countryside) and PROCAMPO (the Program of Direct 
Support for the Countryside). The Target Income/Market Support Program’s purpose is to 
strengthen agricultural trade by building markets between producers and buyers. The program’s 
objectives include distributing marketing information to agricultural producers in order to increase 
exports. The majority of this support is specifically for medium to large producers who are 
exporting grains and oilseeds. There has also been disparity in where the support has gone as four 
states in northern and central Mexico received over 80% of these funds (Income 2005, 252). 
Therefore we find little evidence that this program helped small-scale farmers. 
Alianza por el Campo (Alianza) is a governmental program that was designed to assist in 
increasing agricultural and rural infrastructure.  Specifically rural Mexican agricultural producers tend 
to have low yields and low rates of technological adoption. The main objectives of Alianza are to 8 
 
increase rural agricultural producers’ incomes, to create food security, and improve the balance of 
trade. Alianza has four main programs: agricultural improvement, livestock improvement, rural 
development, and sanitation (Suvedi 2000, 4-5). By providing funds for these infrastructure 
improvements farmers should more easily make the transition to cash crops production and increase 
exports. However, one evaluation of Alianza showed that ejidatario participation in Alianza had “no 
significant impact on the household’s poverty” (Cord 2001, 2).  This may imply that only the middle 
and large producers reap the benefits of this program. 
The Program of Direct Support for the Countryside (PROCAMPO) was specifically created 
to address the effects that NAFTA would have on Mexican agricultural producers. Among these 
concerns were that foreign competition as well as structural changes in Mexican agricultural policy 
would lead to an increase in poverty in rural farming communities, from the loss of import 
subsidies, price supports, and import protection. The PROCAMPO program represented a shift 
from price-based supports to direct income subsidies to producers. Initiating a cash transfer 
program allows the government to assist the producers without distorting the market price for the 
various crops. It also tends to have lower administrative costs.  
Producers of any of nine crops would receive payments based on the number of hectares 
seeded for the three crop-cycle years preceding the August 1993 reforms. These crops included 
barley, beans, maize, cotton, rice, sorghum, soy, sunflower and wheat.  The payments are made per 
hectare farmed each crop season and are not tied to production after 1993. This allows for farmers 
to change which crops they produce, such as a movement towards fruits and vegetables, while 
continuing to receive the payments. They also are allowed to transfer land use to farm livestock, 
forestry, or any ecological project and still continue to receive payments.   
It is also important to note that only farmers who could prove that they had farmed one of 
the nine crops prior to 1993 will receive transfers, therefore new producers cannot benefit from this 
program. To give a better idea of the size of this program, in 2003 approximately 2.8 million farmers 
received PROCAMPO payments for 13.7 million hectares of land. Since acreage enrolled in this 
program was fixed in 1993, these numbers have changed very little over the last decade.  Producers 
must apply for payments each agricultural year and are asked to provide proof of planting, however 
there is very little monitoring to see if the land actually is under cultivation.  Applications and 
payments are obtained from the Center for the Assistance of Rural Development (CADER) offices 
and payments are received after planting.  9 
 
The way in which PROCAMPO payments have been distributed has been altered over the 
life of the program in response to producer’s needs as well as administrative costs. Under the 
“traditional PROCAMPO” program, all producers that farm over five hectares must send 
applications to the CADER offices after sowing as was mentioned above. The “anticipated 
PROCAMPO” program was instituted in 2001. This program allows for producers who plant less 
than five hectares to receive payment prior to planting. According to OECD studies, over one third 
of the land and three quarters of the producers now receive their payments through this program 
(OECD 2007, 104). Receiving these payments before the start of the agricultural season provides 
producers the funds to purchase inputs prior to planting, which is especially important to small 
producers who may not have access to traditional credit. Lastly, there is “capitalized PROCAMPO” 
which was introduced in 2002. This method of payment allows producers to use all future 
PROCAMPO payments (through the life of the program) as collateral. However, this is a more 
technical process as producers must submit their proposed project for capital improvement to both 
the CADER offices and credit institutions. As of 2006 approximately twenty percent of 
PROCAMPO beneficiaries were participating in the “capitalized PROCAMPO” program (Winters 
2007, 620-621). 
One criticism of PROCAMPO was that the payments may primarily benefit large producers, 
who would have been able to transition to cash crops without the extra financial help. 
Approximately ninety percent of producers receiving PROCAMPO payments cultivated less than 
five hectares, yet they only receive about half of the amount of the total payments (Cord 2001, 4). 
However, an interesting element of this program is that small producers may benefit relatively more 
from the program since the payment is made per hectare farmed and is not based on actual yield and 
therefore they can be technically inefficient and still receive the same payment as someone who has 
improved seed, fertilizers, pesticides, and equipment. One additional note regarding PROCAMPO is 
that under this system more subsistence farmers receive financial benefits. Under the previous 
system of price supports, CONASUPO, most of the rural poor did not benefit from the price 
supports as they did not produce enough to sell. The PROCAMPO program is then seen as having a 
positive effect on raising agricultural producers’ incomes and reducing rural poverty.  
One purpose of PROCAMPO, as a government sponsored cash transfer program, is to 
provide supplemental income to the producers. These cash transfers can also have indirect effects if 
the payments are invested into productivity improving resources.  Since PROCAMPO payments are 
made regardless of yield, farmers can depend on them and therefore may be willing to use payments 10 
 
to invest in improvements. For example, a farmer who wants to purchase a piece of farm equipment 
may be more likely to do so because he can depend on the incoming PROCAMPO payments to 
help him to pay off the loan on the equipment.  Therefore the poor are more likely to make riskier 
decisions based on knowledge of incoming funds (Cord 2001, 10). They may also be more willing to 
make the capital investment necessary to transition from producing only staple crops, to the 
production of cash crops.   
PROCAMPO was initially set-up to span the 15-year transitional period established by 
NAFTA and would therefore be discontinued in December 2008. The funding was scheduled to 
slowly decline over this 15-year period.  This period was to give Mexican farmers time to modify 
land use and adopt new technologies. In 2007, President Calderon announced that he would extend 
the PROCAMPO program for an additional four years. Therefore it is currently set to be dismantled 
in 2012. Due to heavy dependence on these subsidies by the rural poor it would be difficult to 
completely eliminate the program, and a new type of agricultural assistance program may be 
necessary.   
3.  CONCEPTUAL MODEL 
To consider the forces that affect crop choice, we use the agricultural household model. The 
agricultural household model has been used extensively in the past twenty years for examining the 
effects of policy changes on agricultural households in developing countries. The original model 
developed by Singh, Squire, and Strauss (1986) brought to light the main difficulty in studying 
agricultural households; these households are both consumers and producers. Therefore consumer 
and producer theory must be combined to create a model that truly reflects decision making in a 
dynamic agricultural household.  
Several studies use the agricultural household model to examine policies that affect rural 
households in Mexico. Key, Sadoulet, and de Janvry (2000) use an agricultural-household model to 
determine the effect of transaction costs on production choices made by rural households in 
Mexico. For example, the assumption of perfect markets can alter results significantly as many 
agricultural producers in Mexico face imperfect markets where transaction costs are often extremely 
high. Taylor, Dyer, and Yunez-Naude (2005) create a disaggregated rural economy-wide model using 
data from west-central Mexico, to show that lower maize prices have negative income effects on 
both large and small scale producers.  11 
 
In the basic agricultural household model, households chose the level of land   and capital 
 to invest in the production of staples  and cash crops  . We assume these choices are 
made to maximize utility from consumption of staple crops and all other goods purchased in the 
market,  and  , respectively. We use   as our numeraire good, with price  =1. The model is 
based on the period of one agricultural year, with the agricultural year starting just prior to planting.  








If credit constrained the following must also be true: 
 
 
Income from agricultural production consists of the price they receive for their agricultural 
goods sold minus the transaction costs ( ) to get the product to market times the quantity sold in the 
marketplace. Second, any wealth endowment , which we will define as cash carried over from 
the previous agricultural cycle, and government payments  , including PROCAMPO, 
PROGRESA, and other market support programs, are added to this amount. Lastly, the cost of 
capital and the price of consumption goods times the quantity of goods consumed are subtracted 
from the household’s income. We assume that not all incoming money is spent but that some is 
saved to be used in the next agricultural cycle ( .  
We assume each farm produces only two goods, staple crops and cash crops. Production of 
each good is a function of land ( ) and capital ( ), where it is assumed that the capital and input 
requirements for the production of cash crops is greater than that for staples
3. In addition, we 
include two inequality constraints. First, the land planted in staples plus the land planted in cash 
                                                           
3 Since we do not have access to data on farm labor it is not included in our production function. We assume all labor is 
on-farm labor which also negates the need for a labor time constraint.  
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crops must be less than or equal to the total available agricultural land.  Second, the quantity of 
staples sent to the market and the quantity of staples consumed by the household must be less than 
or equal to the total production of staples. Capital investment for producing cash crops is higher 
than that for producing staples and cash crops are being produced primarily for the market and 
therefore are not being consumed by the household. If we assume that the producers are credit 
constrained, then the last constraint must be true, which states that current government payments 
plus wealth minus the investment in capital for staple and cash crops must be greater than or equal 
to zero.  
As discussed above, several factors might affect the crop choices made by agricultural 
producers in Mexico after NAFTA went into effect and price supports were eliminated. We believe 
that the following variables help to explain why the choice was made to move from staple crop 
production to cash crop production. However, we are constrained by the data available from the 
Mexican government which will be discussed further in the data section.   
Our main dependent variable is the percent of agricultural land planted in staples.
4 We chose 
this as our dependent variable as one of the purposes of PROCAMPO payments is to assist 
producers in moving out of staple crop production towards the production of crops with a higher 
market value. We define staples as the nine crops that were eligible to receive PROCAMPO 
payments. We propose that the agricultural household model will show that the change in the 
percent of land in cash crops as a percent of the change in government payments will be greater 
than zero ( ). This supports our hypothesis that PROCAMPO payments will assist 
people in moving from staple crop production to cash crop production.  
Our independent variables include those that represent local market demand, transportation 
costs, transition costs, and the effects of governmental policies. Our market demand variables are 
total population in thousands and wages per worker.
5  The wages per worker variable only includes 
wages from manufacturing, wholesale/retail, and services sectors. It does not contain information 
on agricultural wages which allows us to refer to it as off-farm wages. This measure of income 
provides us with an idea of the market demand for cash crops, as Bennet’s Law states that as 
incomes increase the per capita consumption of starchy staple crops will fall. Therefore an increase 
                                                           
4 This variable was created by dividing the area planted in staples by the total area planted of all crops. 
5 The log of both these variables has been taken because of their initial skewed distribution. 13 
 
in demand for cash crops should cause the price of cash crops  to increase, which will provide 
additional incentives for producers to switch to cash crop production. 
The distance to the United States border along with local infrastructure may affect the 
transaction costs associated with participating in the market opportunities created by NAFTA.  The 
distance variable is the road distance, in thousands of kilometers, from each county seat to the 
closest United States border crossing point.
6 We would expect that as distance from the border 
increases transaction costs  also increase. Therefore those producers further from the border will 
be more likely to stay in staple crop production, as the transportation costs to send cash crops to the 
market are too high. Conversely, this would mean that those areas closest to the border would have 
lower transaction costs and would therefore produce fewer staples after NAFTA.  
The infrastructure variable is an index of two infrastructure variables: percent of households 
with drainage and percent of households with sanitation.
7 This variable provides us with a proxy for 
households that are linked to sewage systems. Since sewage is much more common in developed 
urban areas this allows us to pull out details on how remoteness from markets may affect crop 
choice.  We would expect that an increase in infrastructure would be associated with lower 
transaction costs   as the producers may be close to a market. 
The variable that we use to capture transition costs from staple to cash crops is the percent 
of individuals in a county that have a high school education. We believe that those who are literate 
and have at least a high school education are better able to make the transition to cash crops. 
Producers with higher levels of education tend to have greater access to market information and 
may be more likely to fill out applications for credit and funding from various government 
programs. Since these are often complicated documents, without literacy and education it would be 
very difficult to receive benefits from these institutions. The high school education variable shows 
the percent of people in a county that have received a high school degree. Based on this discussion 
we would expect that as education levels increase the transition costs related to switching to cash 
crop production  will decrease.   
There are three variables that capture government policies, including PROCAMPO, 
PROGRESA
8, and other government payments. We ask whether or not these programs are 
alleviating the credit constraint of producers, which then enables them to make the transition from 
                                                           
6 This variable was created by Rafael Garduño-Rivera. Please reference Garduño-Rivera (2009) page 18 for more details. 
7 These variables were created by Rafael Garduño-Rivera. Please reference Garduño-Rivera (2009) pages 18-19 for more 
details. 
8 Program for Education, Health and Nutrition 14 
 
staple to cash crop production. The PROCAMPO payment per producer variable was created by 
dividing the total amount paid to a county by the number of producers that received the payments. 
This gives us a proxy for the liquidity constraint of producers.  PROGRESA is a social welfare 
program that provides conditional cash transfers for education, nutrition and health. This program is 
targeted specifically at poor rural communities and many households that receive PROCAMPO 
payments may also receive PROGRESA payments. The PROGRESA payment per person variable 
was generated by dividing the total amount of payments to a county by the population of the 
county.
9 Our total other government payments variable is total government payments made to 
agriculture divided by the number of farms in 1991. Total government payments include both 
federal and state funds distributed to programs for the improvement of the agricultural sector and 
rural communities. These programs include irrigation, infrastructure development, technical 
improvements, research and transfer, livestock development, health and food safety, and marketing 
support.
10 Our expectation is that all these payments would increase producer’s incomes through   
which would in turn reduce their credit constraint and allow them to transition to cash crop 
production. Therefore we would expect these programs to allow for producers to move out of 
staple crop production. 
We also created a dummy variable to represent NAFTA, where years prior to the 
implementation of NAFTA are zero and those years after NAFTA are one. Additionally interaction 
term between NAFTA and distance to the border, total population in thousands, and wages per 
worker were created. Creating these interaction terms allows me to isolate the effects of certain 
variables after NAFTA. For, example we expect the distance to the United States border to have a 
greater effect on staple crop production after NAFTA than before NAFTA. Those who are closer 
to the United States border should face lower transportation and transaction costs related to sending 
their crops to the United States and Canada, and therefore should be better able to transition out of 
staple crop production.  
                                                           
9 The PROGRESA data does not contain total number of beneficiaries of payments per county and that is why total 
population was used. 
10Since we did not have information on how many producers received these payments we normalized the data using the 
number of farms in each county in 1991.  We also divided the total government payments by the number of producers 
who received PROPCAMPO payments. However, we feel that normalizing by the total number of farms in 1991 gives a 
better estimation, as not all agricultural producers receive PROCAMPO payments and we do not have access to data on 
the total number of farms in 2001 or 2003.Using the PROCAMPO producers as the divisor would therefore cause an 
overstatement of benefits to PROCAMPO producers. 15 
 
4.  DATA AND ECONOMETRIC MODELS 
4.1. Data 
The majority of the data used in this study was obtained from Mexico’s National Institute of 
Statistics, Geography and Information (INGEGI). The infrastructure and economic data were 
obtained from Sistema Municipal de Base de Datos (SIMBAD) and come from the economic censuses 
of 1989, 1999, and 2004 and the general population censuses of 1990, 2000, and 2005.
11 The 
agricultural data comes from the 1991 agricultural census and the annual agricultural yearbooks for 
the following agricultural years, 2000/2001 and 2002/2003. The PROCAMPO data and information 
on credit and other government payments was also obtained from the annual agricultural yearbooks 
for agricultural years 2000/2001 and 2002/2003. The PROGRESA/ Oportunidades data is the only 
data not provided by INEGI. It is available directly through the Oportunidades website for 2002 and 
2003. Our final dataset contains information related to wealth, general agricultural production, 
producer characteristics, and program participation for a year prior to NAFTA and for two years 
after NAFTA was implemented.
12 All our variables are further described in Table A-2.
13 
The crop and PROCAMPO data from the annual agricultural yearbooks was very disjointed 
as each state did not report the exact same variable. Because of this issue our dataset includes only 
those variables for which data was reported for the majority of states. In addition, agricultural data 
for several states is only reported at the district level, which is a group of counties.
14 Since the size (in 
square kilometers) for counties and districts varies widely, we weight the results by the agricultural 
area in each county and district.
15 Additionally, the information on credit and other government 
payments to agriculture is only reported at the state level. The information for other government 
payments is distributed to the county and district level based on agricultural hectares in each county 
or district. The information on credit will only be evaluated at the state level and all other variables 
will be summed up to the state level for our credit model.  
                                                           
11 This cleaned data file was obtained from Rafael Garduño-Rivera, for further details please reference, Baylis, Garduño-
Rivera, Piras (2009), pp. 16. 
12 Please note that all payment data reported in pesos has been discounted by the 2003 Consumer Price Index. 
13 To formulate three complete years we had to move years of data slightly; however we do not believe this change 
significantly alters any results. For example, the PROCAMPO, government payment and credit data for agricultural year 
2000/2001 was mapped to 2001, and 2002/2003 was mapped to 2003. 
14 Therefore eleven states, Baja California Norte, Coahuila, Distrito Federal, Guanajuato, Guerrero, Edo Mexico, Nuevo 
Leon, Oaxaca, Sinaloa, Sonora, and Tlaxcala will have all results reported at the district level.   
15 Our agricultural base variable is used as the weight and was generated from the 1991 total agricultural hectares and the 
2001 and 2003 agricultural area in hectares that received PROCAMPO payments. The greatest agricultural area was then 
drawn from each county to form the agricultural base variable. 16 
 
To better visualize the spatial distribution of our data across the whole country, we 
generated maps of all of the key variables. Please reference Figures 1-6. These were created by 
joining our data to a spatial file of all the counties in ESRI’s ArcGIS. For the majority of our 
variables we created side by side maps, in which the data for 1991, is on the left-hand side and the 
data for 2003 will be on the right-hand side. There are a few figures that are worth discussing in 
some detail. Figure 1 is our dependent variable, the percent of agricultural land planted in staples. 
Simply based on this projection of raw data one can see that there are several regions in northern 
Mexico that produce less staples as a percentage of all crops than they did in 1991. Thus, some areas 
have reduced the amount of staple crops they produce since NAFTA. Figure 4 shows the percent of 
people within a county that have a high school education. We can see that education levels have 
risen over time and the counties that now have the highest percentage of high school educated 
people tend to be in the north-east and along the north-western coast.  
Our PROCAMPO variable and PROGRESA variable can be seen in Figure 5. Since these 
programs were instituted after NAFTA, we only have data for 2001 and 2003. We have projected 
the data for 2003 for both variables. Since we know that each hectare receives the same payment, 
the PROCAMPO payment per producer shows the farm size distribution across the country. We 
can see that many of the larger producers are in northern and central Mexico. We also map the 
PROGRESA payments per person. Since this program was targeted specifically at the rural poor, 
this map depicts the actual spatial distribution of the rural poor, who tend to be concentrated in 
central and southern Mexico. For additional details please also reference Table A-3 for summary 
statistics of our main variables.  
Since our data is at the county level, we assume that agricultural households within a county 
are relatively homogenous. To support our assumption we use individual census data from 1990 that 
comprises 10% of the population of Mexico. From this data we obtain the means and standard 
deviations both within and between counties. Please refer to Table A-4 in the Appendix for the 
results. We examine wages and education for those working in agriculture and who own agricultural 
land. The average of the variation of wages within a county is 1,095,499, whereas the national 
variance of county averages is 2,124,893. Like the latter number, our data is comprised of county-
level means, which appear to have greater variation than within county data. The education variable 
supports the same conclusion, as the average variance within a county is 0.6909 while the variance of 
county averages is larger at 0.7444.  17 
 
Additionally, we have access to geographic information such as elevation and climate. Since 
we know that elevations and climates affect crop choice it follows that those producers within a 
county will face similar physical constraints. This provides further evidence that municipalities are 
fairly homogenous. Agriculture in mountainous or arid areas is constrained by certain factors. 
Therefore, if the elevation and climate is similar for all producers within a county they will tend to 
produce a set of similar crops. Producers within a county will also face similar water resources which 
will directly affect which crops they are able to grow. 
4.2. Model 1: Percent of Agricultural Land in Staple Production  
Our first proposal is to examine the percent change in agricultural land used for the 
production of staple crops as a function of local market demand, transportation cost, transition cost, 
and government policies. 
 
1)   
2)   
3)   
4)   
4.2.1.  Initial Regression Results 
Initially we ran five econometric models using the basic equation described above. These 
include 1) ordinary least squares (OLS), 2) fixed effects (FE), 3) fixed effects weighted by total 
agricultural land (weighted FE), 4) random effects (RE) and 5) random effects weighted by total 
agricultural land (weighted RE).
16 The results are detailed in Table 1. As a brief overview of the 
results; population, government payments, and distance to the border are positive in all models and 
wages, high school and the infrastructure index are negative in all models. The only two variables 
that change signs across models are PROCAMPO and PROGRESA; reasons for this will be 
discussed in detail later in this analysis.  
We know that an OLS model will not be the most appropriate since our data is panel data, a 
cross-sectional dataset of information on the same counties over time. However it is beneficial to 
look at the results generated from the OLS model. Population, PROCAMPO, government 
payments, and distance to the US border are all positive, however government payments is not 
significant at the 5% level. The population variable is significant and shows that for a 1% change in 
                                                           
16 We conducted the Breusch-Pagan / Cook-Weisberg test for heteroskedasticity. With the result being chi2(1) = 33.23 
and Prob > chi2 =0.0000. Since heteroskedasticity is present we will use robust standard errors for all models. 18 
 
the population there is 7% increase in staple crop production. The wages per worker and high 
school education variables are both negative, as we would expect them to be. For a 1% increase in 
wages per worker there is a 4% decrease in staple crop production. Our two variables that we are 
using to proxy for market demand, population and wages, are in effect offsetting each other as one 
is positive and one is negative.  
The fixed effects (FE) model allows for the intercepts to vary across individuals, therefore an 
individual intercept for each county will be calculated. In doing this it strips out the entire cross 
sectional effects and leaves us only with variance over time. In our FE model, population, 
PROGRESA payments, government payments, and distance to the border
17 are all positive. This 
model has population playing a greater role than the OLS model, in that a 1% increase in the 
population leads to a 32% increase in staple production. Wages per worker, high school education, 
and PROCAMPO payments are all negative. It is interesting that in the OLS model PROCAMPO 
had a positive sign but in the FE model the sign switches to negative. Therefore for a 1% increase in 
PROCAMPO payments there is a 7.5% decrease in the area planted in staples. A negative sign is 
what we hoped to see on the PROCAMPO variable as it was a program that was targeted at 
reducing credit constraint and assisting producers in moving out of staple crop production.   
 The random effects (RE) model also allows for different intercepts but instead of 
calculating them separately like the FE model does, it estimates a variance of the intercepts. The RE 
model allows cross-sectional variation to influence the estimates of the coefficients. Therefore the 
RE model enables us to see effects both over time and between counties. We also use this model as 
we believe that there are differences across counties that have some influence on crop choice. Just 
like in the OLS and FE models, population and distance to the border are positive, and wages and 
high school education are negative. PROCAMPO is negative in this model, so for a 1% increase in 
PROCAMPO payments there is a 2.7% reduction in area planted in staples. PROGRESA payments 
and government payments are not statistically significant in this model.  
Results from two other models, weighted FE and weighted RE are also reported. We know 
that we need to weight the regression by total agricultural surface area as the counties and districts 
are of varying size. For example, the largest district has 3.7 million hectares of agricultural land 
(district in Coahuila) and the smallest county has only 1 hectare (district in Distrito Federal, which is 
Mexico City.) By creating a weighted version of both the FE and RE models, counties and district 
                                                           
17 Our distance to the US border variable is time-invariant. Therefore it is dropped by the fixed effects regression and 
absorbed by the intercept. The Fixed Effects Vector Decomposition (FEVD) model created by Plümper and Troeger 
was used to obtain the coefficient distance to the US border. (Plümper 2007) 19 
 
that are larger in land area will count more in the regression, a feature necessary for obtaining 
accurate results. We will discuss the weighted models in more detail in the next section. 
4.2.2.  Main Model Results 
Next, we take the model constructed above but add in a NAFTA variable, which is our 
dummy variable where years after 1994 equal 1. We also constructed three interactions with 
NAFTA. Specifically, we interact NAFTA with our population, wages per worker, and distance to 
the border variables. This will allow us to determine if the effects of these variables on staple crop 
production changes after NAFTA. We then ran both weighted FE and weighted RE models. These 
results can be seen in Table 2.
18 
We will examine the weighted FE in comparison to the weighted RE model with our 
dependent variable being the percent of agricultural land in staples. These two regressions are what 
we refer to as our main model in later discussions. For the FE model all our variables are statistically 
significant at the 5% level except for the NAFTA dummy and the NAFTA×population interaction 
term. We are not concerned with the NAFTA dummy being insignificant as some of the significance 
of this variable is going to the NAFTA interaction terms. For the RE model all of our variables are 
statistically significant at the 5% level.  
First, we will discuss our main variable of interest, PROCAMPO payments. The 
PROCAMPO variable tells an interesting story in that in the FE model it is negative and in the RE 
model it is positive. In the FE model a 1% change in PROCAMPO payments leads to a 5.3% 
decrease in land planted in staple crops. This result makes intuitive sense as the FE is only taking in 
the time effects, and the purpose of PROCAMPO is to provide assistance to switch from staple 
crop production to cash crop production for export. In the RE model, since the counties are also 
being compared to one another, a 1% higher PROCAMPO payment in one county means that the 
county also has 3% more land planted in staples. Since PROCAMPO was a program that only goes 
to producers who were planting staples in 1993/1994, it makes sense that those municipalities which 
receive PROCAMPO payments would have a higher percentage of crops in staples. Thus, we 
believe that the RE model is largely picking up the placement of the PROCAMPO program.  
                                                           
18 Throughout this analysis we examine both fixed effects and random effects models. The results of the Hausman test 
and an additional test of the averages concludes that the RE model is not capturing everything and therefore the FE 
model is the more precise model.  
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The PROGRESA payments per person and other government payments per farm 
coefficients are positive in both models. Our initial speculation was that these payments would 
increase the amount of cash crops by decreasing the credit constraints faced by producers. However, 
in the FE model, one percent increase in PROGRESA payment increases the percentage of land in 
staple crops by 52% and the RE model reports an increase of 23%. The positive effect of 
PROGRESA may be due to the fact that it is a program that is specifically targeted at the poorest 
rural communities in Mexico. Therefore it is going to areas that traditionally would have a higher 
proportion of subsistence farmers and would be more likely to have a greater percentage of land 
planted in staple crops to start with. Receiving PROGRESA is also contingent on children attending 
school. This may reduce farm labor, which will decrease the amount of other crops produced. Also 
this program started with only a few communities receiving benefits but since 1997, it has expanded 
to cover a much greater portion of the population. Since the amount of payments is increasing each 
year the FE model may just be capturing the increase in the number of poor people participating in 
the program in each county.  
The other government payments variable is also positive in both models with an effect of a 
3.4-3.8% increase in staples for a 1% increase in other government payments. This positive effect 
may be due in part to the fact that price supports for some staple crops were not immediately 
removed in 1994, but were slowly phased out during the 15-year transition period. Two important 
staple crops, corn and beans, were both part of this slow phase out. These additional payments to 
producers of some staple crops may have induced them not to switch to cash crop production. 
These other payments are in some ways counteracting the effect that PROCAMPO is having, as 
they actually compel producers to continue producing certain staple crops.  
Our variables that proxy for market demands are population and wages per worker. The 
population variable is positive in both models; however the magnitude is much different between 
the two models. In the FE model for a 1% change in population the area planted in staple crops 
increases by 26%, whereas in the RE model the increase is only 6%. Wages per worker is negative in 
both models and the magnitudes of their effect on staple crop production are also very similar. The 
FE model reports a 5% reduction in staple crop production and the RE model reports a 4% 
decrease given a 1% increase in wages. Thus, in both models it appears as if a larger population is 
associated with a greater demand for staples, while higher income indicates a market for cash crops.  
Next we examine our variables that represent transition costs, education levels and 
infrastructure. Both the FE and RE models show that for a 1% increase in high school education 21 
 
staple crop production decrease by 1.9%. Since education is often needed for producers to fill out 
credit forms and apply for government payments we would expect that an increase in education 
would lead to a decrease in staple crop production. Our infrastructure variable shows the percent of 
households within a county that have access to a sewage system. This variable is negative in both the 
FE and RE models. These variables taken together appear to imply that as education and 
infrastructure increase, then staple crop production decreases. Therefore education and 
infrastructure may decrease transaction costs which allows for producers to more easily transition to 
cash crop production. 
We also added in a NAFTA dummy variable and various interactions terms. We interacted 
the NAFTA dummy with our population, wages, and distance variable to see if their effect changes 
after NAFTA. Table 2.1 details the affects of these variables before and after NAFTA. The total 
calculated effect of NAFTA in our FE model at the average of population, wages and distance is 
that after NAFTA staple crops increase by 1%, however this is not significant. The difference 
between the effect of population before and after NAFTA is less than 1%, so population has 
minimal affect on production decisions. The effect of wages after NAFTA becomes positive, but it 
is not statistically significant. Distance to the border has a much greater effect after NAFTA. Prior 
to NAFTA a 1% increase in distance led to a 1.3% increase in staple crop production. After 
NAFTA a 1% increase in distance leads to a 7.3% increase in staple crop production. Distance from 
the United States border does likely increase transaction and transportation costs which make 
producers in southern Mexico less likely to switch to cash crop production. 
In our RE model the overall effect after NAFTA is significant. After NAFTA, at the average 
of our interaction variables, staple crop production decreases by 7.7%. Similar to the results of our 
FE model, population does not appear to have that much greater of an effect after NAFTA. 
Additionally wages, appear to have less of an effect after NAFTA. Taken together this once again 
supports the idea that producers are switching to cash crops not based on local market demand, but 
based on the new markets in the US and Canada. The effect of distance is actually negative before 
NAFTA, we believe this may be in part due to the fact that there are areas in the southern-most part 
of Mexico that have traditionally produced items that would be consider cash crops, such as coffee 
and citrus. They already produced these prior to NAFTA due to having the right climate and land 
quality. Other than this region, most of Mexico was producing staple crops. This explanation may 
help account for why areas further from the border were producing less staple crops prior to 
NAFTA. After NAFTA the distance coefficient does become positive and for a 1% increase in 22 
 
distance from the US border there is a 4.6% increase in staple crop production. This effect is similar 
to that reported by the FE model. 
4.2.3.  Robustness Tests 
To determine the robustness of our main results we ran several different versions of our 
model.
19 First, we ran the exact same model above except with revenue per hectare as our dependent 
variable. Secondly, we reduced the number of counties in our model to only include those that 
contain either a high percentage of ejidal lands or receive a high amount of PROGRESA payments. 
Details of these robustness tests follow.  
For comparison purposes we ran weighted FE and weighted RE models with the dependent 
variable now being total agricultural revenue and all the independent variables remaining the same as 
our main model. Since the price of staples should be lower than the price of cash crops, we would 
expect higher revenue per hectare to be associated with less staple crops. This means that the signs 
on our coefficients should be opposite of what they were in the previous model. Please reference 
Table 3 for the results of this regression. In the FE model all variables are statistically insignificant at 
the 5% level except for population and high school education. Therefore analyzing this model does 
not yield much information. It is worth noting that the high school education variable now has a 
positive sign, and for a 1% increase in education there is a 167 peso increase in revenue per hectare.  
The RE model provides us with more tangible results in that all variables are significant at 
the 5% level. The majority of the coefficients on the variables also have signs opposite to the main 
model. The education and infrastructure variables that were consistently negative in our main model 
are now positive.  For a 1% increase in education there is a 103 peso increase in revenue per hectare. 
This shows that areas with higher revenue per hectare are associated with higher education and 
infrastructure.  
PROCAMPO and PROGRESA payments are now negative but the coefficient on other 
government payments is positive. The coefficient on PROCAMPO was positive in our main FE 
model, as it was comparing counties, and counties that were producing more staples will tend to 
have higher total PROCAMPO payments. We now see that for a 1% increase in PROCAMPO 
payments there is a 609 peso decrease in revenue. For PROGRESA we see something similar in that 
                                                           
19 We also have data on two other variables, literacy, and cities, which is a dummy variable that is equal to one if a county 
has a city with over 100,000 people. Neither of these variables provided much additional information therefore they are 
not included in the main model. The results of the models that contain these variables can be seen in Table A-5 of the 
Appendix. Since our dependent variable is a percentage constrained to be between 0 and 1, we also ran a Tobit model to 
see if there was anything that our FE and RE models were not capturing. The results changed very little but are reported 
in Table A-6 of the Appendix. 23 
 
for a 1% increase in PROGRESA payments there is a 4,821 peso decrease in revenue per hectare. 
This result supports the idea that revenue per hectare is lower in places that traditionally planted 
staples and are defined as areas with a high concentration of rural poor. Other government 
payments continue to be positive and for a 1% increase in government payments there is a 399 peso 
increase in revenue. Since some of this government revenue is from programs such as Alianza, 
which provides technical assistance in order to increase yields and exports, or irrigation projects, it 
makes sense that it would have a positive effect on revenue per hectare.  
Those areas that receive PROCAMPO and PROGRESA payments are not random, but 
specifically targeted based on certain characteristics.  PROCAMPO is only received by those who 
were producing staple crops just prior to 1993. PROGRESA is specifically directed to the poorest 
rural communities in Mexico based on census data and interviews. Therefore we feel that it is 
important to create these two models that will test the robustness of our main model. In addition, 
there has been concern that PROCAMPO benefits the large producers, but not necessarily the small 
subsistence farmers. By examining areas that have a high percentage of ejidal lands or a high amount 
of PROGRESA payments we hope to see if the PROCAMPO program has a similar or different 
effect from the main model.  
First, we calculate the percent of agricultural land within a county that is categorized as ejidal 
land. We then keep only the half of the data that has the percentage of ejidal lands as greater than the 
mean. We then run our main model on this smaller set of counties. Please see Figure 7 for a 
distribution of these select counties in Mexico. The results of our regression are reported in Table 4.  
We focus on the variables that see a marked difference from the main model. In general, the results 
of this model do not differ as greatly from the main model as we had originally expected. The effect 
of PROCAMPO payments is larger in this model. In the FE model, for a 1% increase in 
PROCAMPO payments, there is a 6.2% reduction in staple crop production, whereas in our main 
model it was only a 5.3% reduction. PROGRESA payments have a smaller effect in both the FE 
and RE models using this truncated dataset. In the FE model the effect goes from a 52% increase in 
staples in our original model to only a 45% increase using just counties with a high percentage of 
ejidal lands. Interestingly, education appears to have a greater affect in this model.  
If we examine our NAFTA interaction terms in the FE model, we can see that the effect of 
distance to the border increased after NAFTA. After NAFTA, a 1% increase in distance to the 
border leads to an 8.7% increase in staples. This shows that the after-NAFTA effect is greater where 
the percent of ejidal lands is higher, as our main model with all counties included reports a 7.3% 24 
 
increase in staple production after NAFTA given a 1% increase in distance to the border. The 
effects of our interaction terms before and after NAFTA can be seen in Table 4.1. The RE model 
also reports similar results in regards to the distance to the border variable.  
Next, since PROGRESA is targeted at the poorest communities in Mexico, we form a 
dataset that only includes those counties that have PROGRESA payments per person that are 
greater than the mean.
20 Please see Figure 4 for a distribution of these select counties in Mexico. we 
then run our main model using only these counties. If we look at our education variable in the FE 
model, a 1% increase in education coincides with a staple crop production decrease of 0.83%. This 
is a much smaller effect than in the main model, in which it causes a 1.9% reduction in staples. This 
reflects that education levels are lower in counties that have received greater PROGRESA payments, 
which is consistent with the nature of the program. Also the mean of high school education in this 
sample is 4.3% whereas the mean in the complete dataset is 6%. In the RE model this reduction is 
much greater as a 1% increase in education only causes a 0.69% decrease in staples.  
The PROCAMPO and PROGRESA variables are not significant in the FE model. However, 
the coefficients on these variables in the RE model are quite different from our original model. For 
example, PROCAMPO has a greater effect on staple crop production than in the main model. For a 
1% increase in PROCAMPO payments we see a 7.4% increase in staple crop production, whereas it 
was a 3.2% decrease in the main model. This positive coefficient in the RE model may be due to this 
smaller dataset containing a large proportion of subsistence farms who traditionally producer staple 
crops, and by comparing counties to each other this effect is being picked up. The PROGRESA 
variables effect is much smaller now, as we would expect. Since this dataset now only includes those 
counties that receive a high amount of PROGRESA payments, the variation between county is 
going to be much smaller. In the original model, it had a positive effect of 22% and now it only has 
a positive effect of 3.9%.  
If we examine distance from the US border, we see that before NAFTA if distance increases 
by 1% it causes a 13% reduction in staple crop production. Possible reasons for this were discussed 
previously. After NAFTA it has a positive effect yet it is very small as there is only a 2% increase in 
staple crops. Please refer to Table 4.2 for the before and after NAFTA coefficients for our 
interaction terms. We believe that we see a much smaller coefficient after NAFTA when we just 
look at areas that receive larger PROGRESA payments, as many of the area closest to the border are 
no longer included in the model. When comparing relatively poorer counties to other poor counties, 
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distance to the US border becomes less important as a determining factor in regards to staple crop 
production. 
If we compare the overall effect of NAFTA on ejidal lands and the areas with greater 
PROGRESA payments, we see an interesting result. The ejidal model shows the area in staple crop 
production decreasing after NAFTA, whereas the PROGRESA model shows staple production 
increasing after NAFTA. The coefficients are insignificant for both the FE models. The RE model 
for ejidal lands shows that after NAFTA, land in staple crop production decreases by 10.8%. The RE 
model for PROGRESA shows a 10% increase in staple crop production after NAFTA. This is an 
interesting result, and shows that ejidos may be responding differently to the new markets created by 
NAFTA than those who are just poor, as measured by PROGRESA.  
4.3. Model 2: Total Credit 
As has been stated we are interested in seeing if producers are credit constrained and if 
PROCAMPO payments as well as other government payments provide them with liquidity. The 
data that we have on credit is only provided at the state level. Please reference Table A-7 for state-
level summary statistics. Figure 8 shows the distribution of our credit variable by state. A few states 
did not report credit data. Nonetheless, the distribution of credit supports the idea that credit tends 
to go to larger producers, as the states that have larger farms also have greater amounts of credit. 
This effect can be seen by comparing the map of our PROCAMPO payments (Figure 1) to this 
credit map. We will run our model at the state level with similar variables to our main model except 
that total credit received in thousands of pesos is our dependent variable. Our credit equation is: 
 
1)   
2)   
We generate both fixed effects and random effects models using this data. Both models are 
weighted by total agricultural land in a county. This model will only compare two years, 2001 and 
2003, as we do not have credit data for years prior to NAFTA. In our fixed effects model very little 
is significant at the 5% level, which is understandable given that we only have two years of credit 
data.  However, the coefficient on our main program of interest, PROCAMPO, is significant at the 
5% level. For a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments there is a 23.6% increase in credit. This 
means that over time, PROCAMPO payments do have a positive effect on the credit situation for 
producers within counties. The effect of both PROGRESA and other government payments on 26 
 
credit is negative. Both PROGRESA and other government payments are insignificant and show 
relatively small changes.  
In our weighted random effects model the coefficients on all our variables are significant at 
the 5% level. Once again, we will first look at the effect of our PROCAMPO variable on credit. For 
a 1% increase in PROCAMPO payments there is a 0.53% increase in credit. Now that we are not 
just looking at the time effect, but also comparing counties, the effect of PROCAMPO is much 
smaller. It does have a positive effect on credit which means both our models support the idea that 
PROCAMPO may help alleviate credit constraint. Once again, we see negative coefficients for our 
PROGRESA and other government payments variables. For a 1% increase in PROGRESA there is 
a 0.88% decrease in credit and for a 1% increase in other government payments there is a 0.16% 
decrease in credit. This effect of the government payments may be so small because many of the 
programs in this variable may be going directly to creating infrastructure, irrigation, roads, 
technology, and not actually be funds that go to producers. These are not necessarily direct cash 
payments.  
Wages per worker and percent of the population with a high school education are both 
positive as we would expect. An increase in both wages and education should positively affect credit. 
For a 1% increase in wages we see a 0.61% increase in credit and for a 1% increase in education we 
see an 11% increase in credit. This finding is encouraging to see as both traditionally both wages and 
education are important factors in credit applications. For example, banks may be more willing to 
loan to someone with a high school education than someone with only primary school education. 
Those with a greater level of education also tend to be better equipped to seek credit. 
There are a few limitations of our study.  First, we do not observe farm level data. We are 
able to provide evidence that supports our assumption of county homogeneity; however this still 
does not allow for us to truly observe the decision making in individual agricultural households. In 
addition, based on the results of our Hausman test we can only control for placement of the 
programs using fixed effects, which limits our cross-sectional variation. Lastly, since our credit data 
is only available at the state level we can not explicitly consider PROCAMPO’s affect on an 
agricultural households’ access to credit.   
5.  CONCLUSIONS 
In conclusion, our data and econometric models provide some evidence that PROCAMPO 
assisted producers in moving away from the production of staple crops and towards the production 27 
 
of higher-value, cash crops.  Specifically, we observe a correlation between increased PROCAMPO 
payments and a decrease in the area planted in staples when controlling for county-level fixed 
effects. When we examine our model that only contains the counties with a high percent of ejidal 
lands, the negative effect of PROCAMPO on staple crop production is even stronger. This result 
provides an indication that these decoupled income payments have assisted those who are credit 
constrained to make crop choice changes. However, there is also some evidence that other 
government payments to agriculture has slowed this conversion to cash crops. This effect may be 
due to the lingering price supports and quotas which provided incentives for producers to continue 
planting certain staple crops throughout the NAFTA conversion period.  
We hypothesized that the implementation of NAFTA would be associated with greater cash 
crop production. We can see that the creation of new markets through NAFTA is, in general, 
leading to a reduction in land planted in staples. We also see evidence that producers in both ejidal 
lands and poor regions are responding to new market incentives. Additionally, we hypothesized that 
areas closest to the United States border would see a greater movement to cash crop production 
after NAFTA than those further away from the border.  We find evidence in our model that 
supports this hypothesis. Counties that have decreased staple crop production tend to be closer to 
the border. This may be related to transaction costs, measured in distance to the United States 
border, being higher for those in southern Mexico.  
Since decoupled income payments are a part of the WTO agenda, these results may have a 
broader world-wide application. Given that the rural poor tend not to benefit under a system of 
price supports, a decoupled income payment system such as PROCAMPO can assist the poorest 
producers in a country. In addition, decoupled income payments can reduce agricultural producers’ 
credit constraints. Therefore decoupled income payments may allows for producers to make the 
investments necessary to produce higher-value cash crops, which leads to an increase in income and 
a reduction in rural poverty.  
The results of this study may also provide information that would assist other less-developed 
countries in establishing similar programs. For example, government payments, such as price 
supports, are actually compelling producers to stay in staple crop production. Therefore if a 
government is going to implement a decoupled income program, they should consider minimizing 
the length of time that both the new program and the old price support system co-exist. Moving to 
these subsidies allows for the entire agricultural market support system to be truly decoupled from 
the prices and production of specific crops as well as facilitating the transition to international trade.28 
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